Dealing With Active Shooters

Ever since the school shooting at Columbine in 1999, the issue of school safety has taken on added significance not only among education stakeholders, but also in political, social, and cultural arenas. However, in 2018, the topic became even more significant following several gun violence incidents, most notably one in Parkland, FL. In light of this, Principal Leadership convened a roundtable of educators who have dealt with active shooters and violent school perpetrators, including Warman Hall, principal at Aztec High School in New Mexico; Dale Marsden, superintendent of the San Bernardino City Unified School District in California; and George Roberts, community superintendent in Baltimore County Public Schools and former principal at Perry Hall High School in Baltimore. Principal Leadership Senior Editor Michael Levin-Epstein moderated the roundtable, which focused on the role of the principal in school safety, just days following the school shooting in Santa Fe, TX, in May.

(Principal Leadership fully realizes that one roundtable cannot possibly delve into all the issues surrounding school safety that affect the role of the principal and other education stakeholders. You will notice that we have included discussions of school safety matters in other pages of this issue. We’ll continue to cover the school safety issue in Principal Leadership in this academic year—and beyond.)

Levin-Epstein: You’ve each dealt with active shooters and perpetrators on campus or in your community. Please describe those incidents.

Hall: We had a school shooting at Aztec High School on December 7, 2017. In that school shooting, we had a former student come on campus and begin shooting in two of our hallways. That resulted in the intruder’s suicide and murder of two precious student lives.

As an active shooter situation, the entire event lasted roughly 15 minutes or less, but also caused a response that immediately put our school and district into lockdown and then generated a very swift response from law enforcement and emergency management. Our community is a relatively remote and rural community compared to a lot of places in the country, and shelter-in-place, if not lockdown, was issued in a number of schools around San Juan County that day.

Immediately after the event, my biggest recollection is how much that day was swept up in the tidal flow of trying to work with and coordinate with emergency response as they came to our aid and conducted a room-by-room sweep. Then, at our site, the day culminated in an evacuation to the county fairgrounds, roughly 12 miles away, and a final reunification for families at the fairgrounds.

The shooting occurred at roughly 8:15 a.m., and I recall catching the last bus at 4:00 p.m. as we were evacuated. I also remember returning to the district office in Aztec by 7:00 p.m. after all the kids had gotten picked up and after helping the ongoing effort to make contact with students marked absent on our evacuation roll.

As the kids had been evacuated from our gym, we had crossed names off, and tried then to make contact with them that evening. The campus didn’t get released back to us until two days afterward, on a Saturday, and we immediately began planning the process of opening school back up and supporting kids and staff as they returned.

The other district schools returned to classes the following Monday or Tuesday. We were not able to have kids back on campus at Aztec High for a number of days after that. The first thing that we had to do administratively was meet with school psychologists and counselors from all over the region. They encouraged us to not fully open back up for school right away. Instead, we first brought the staff in and brought them through a debriefing process.

One of the interesting tasks in the initial on-campus recovery effort was identifying backpacks and different belongings that the kids had to leave in the classrooms and hallways when they were evacuated. We brought the kids and their parents in for an afternoon and an evening where they could pick up their belongings and just reconnect with their teachers. That was literally the only goal those days: to have them reconnect with their teachers and re-establish those ties. After a couple of evenings of that opportunity, we did re-initiate our term and actually finished up the semester, telling families that we understood if kids couldn’t physically or emotionally get back to campus. We did feel it was important to re-establish and finish up our term. We ended up with about three school days that we got in before the kids were released for Christmas break.

We’re about three days from finishing our spring term and ending our school year [in May 2018]. We’ve had supports continue with school counseling, psychological support, and even therapy dogs.

Marsden: Much like Warman described were our events as well. What I’ll share that was in addition to those activities is right after the incident occurred, the biggest challenge we faced was rapid communications. Because of the wide and broad use of social media, our communications department really had to work hard to get accurate information out as soon as possible. Often, the time it takes to get accurate information out prior to other information that’s been disseminated—there’s a pretty large gap. What we found is there was a lot of inaccurate information being shared. So, our first priority was to notify the parents of the children, one that was killed and one that was injured, in the incident.

On April 10, 2017, at North Park Elementary School, an estranged husband, Cedric Anderson, walked into the school, breaching all of the protocols that we’d had in place since the December 2, 2015, attack on our community. (If you recall, there was a terrorist attack December 2, 2015, which our schools were right in the middle of, and as a result of our learnings from December 2, we were able to put in protocols for active intruders, training staff.) Single points of entry in some of our schools at that point had already been established, [as well as] security-​wide camera systems.

So, when Cedric came into the school, he tried a different gate, couldn’t get in; came in through the single point of entry through the office, signed in, and … shot and killed his wife (at the time they were newlyweds, and the staff knew nothing different). While doing so, bullets passed through and ended up taking the life of Jonathan Martinez, a high-needs special-needs student with Williams syndrome, and then injured another student, Nolan Brandy, and [took] the life of the teacher, Karen Smith.

The aftermath of that was that we evacuated the children to Cal State San Bernardino, which is our neighboring university, and organized the parents at a neighboring high school to ensure proper release of students, making sure we had control of crowds. Past experiences had taught us that when there’s a crisis and the school is locked down, parents’ No. 1 priority is to get their child. We had to establish a way to do that that made sense in the safest possible way.

Knowing that there was a lot of confusion—a lot of parents worried—our first priority was to communicate with Nolan Brandy’s parents and then to communicate with the family of Karen Smith and with the family of Jonathan Martinez. Once that communication took place and we had confirmed the loss of life, we then notified the rest of the families that no other children had been harmed. The goal was to reduce the anxiety of our other parents as soon as possible, because the reunification took several hours between students and parents. Parents were overall very patient with the process. They had a lot of understanding at the time that we wanted to ensure the safety of the children.

I have to give credit to Rick Kaufman at Columbine; he called us immediately when this incident occurred, and he was such a great guide on the side through this event. I was able to ask a lot of questions and utilize his advice, and we’re utilizing it still. He’s a great advocate for this work. We quickly—the next day—announced that we would not have any decision on closing the site until a couple days later. We ended up closing the school through the weekend, a memorial service, etc., days pending after April 10. We met with all the parents at an elementary school and walked through to listen to what were their concerns and talked to them. We led them through what we call an “after-action review”—it’s a process that’s utilized in the Army that asks three general questions: What happened in what we just experienced together? What did we learn about ourselves, about how we respond? Given our learning, what will we do should something occur in the future? So, we were able to take that information and at the same time provided counseling services after that parent meeting for parents who wanted to know, “How do I talk to my child?”

We had further input sessions so parents who were either angry or confused could hear as much information as we had at the time. We had our police department there sharing the details they had at the time as well. We also, on that same day, we met with the staff, conducted a similar process, but really tried to connect them to some mental health and counseling services. We have continued those mental health and counseling services. We currently still have substitute staff at the school, we have a substitute principal at the school, so that at any time, any of the staff or principal, when they need to, have the ability to step away and to regroup and receive any counseling services, as much as necessary. We met for two full weeks every single day as a cabinet after the event to coordinate logistics, communications, safety, workers’ comp, etc., legal, and so forth. That continued for the two weeks after. We utilized services from our county’s victims support unit and our mental health services—our crisis team, as well, was a part of that conversation.

After those two weeks were up, we spent time meeting once a week every week for quite a while. Then, the school campus—thanks to a lot of people coming together—we were able to bring in a crew that basically cleaned the entire facility, closed the room where the incident took place, then began a refurbishing process, and then over the summer did a major renovation of the campus to where they upgraded complete safety features, doors, etc. It’s really, basically, a brand-new school. We’ve spent to date probably $3 million to $5 million, not counting yet legal costs that may go through this. Those are some things in the aftermath.

We also held a community-wide after-action review with all of our stakeholders and first responders to capture learnings from that event. Since then, we have really worked hard to assess our district, and we’re installing single points of entry at every school, controlling school access—there’s now a visitor management system and buzzer-type controlled entries—visitor policies, procedures, training of our staff, and increased communication systems, etc. So, there’s a lot that’s been done since then, and we’re really working hard to go slow, to go fast, to follow best practices, so we’re not just being reactive or emotional, but we’re truly implementing what is the best approach.

What we’re finding is this is a huge, unfunded liability for school districts. There’s not a center for school safety in California; there is such a center in some states—Maryland, for example—and we’ve encouraged legislators to create such an entity so that when an event occurs at a school, there’s some financial assistance and some sort of structure. We’re a very large district, so we have a lot of resources. I can’t imagine other, smaller districts trying to navigate these situations without people coming to their aid.

Roberts: So, a little bit about Baltimore County: Baltimore County Public Schools is a horseshoe around Baltimore city here in Maryland. We’re the largest land-size county within Maryland. There are 23 counties and Baltimore city. We have 113,000 students, and we’re the 22nd largest [district] in the country. With that, we have 174 schools and centers and the structure and the support that comes with a system that large. My incident occurred on the first day of school in 2012. It was August 2012, really a beautiful day, not unlike today here in Baltimore. Kids were coming in as any first day of school would be—a lot of excitement, a lot of smiles, just that freshness of a first day of school. It coincidentally was also the first day for our new superintendent at that time.

Our day started as normal; kids coming in, instruction starting from day one, our first bell at 7:45 a.m., and we proceeded through our first three periods of class until we got to our first lunch shift, which began at 10:20 a.m. At approximately 10:41 a.m., the student who engaged in the shooting got up—he was in the cafeteria sitting with some friends. He had carried a shotgun with 22 shell casings in his pockets, as well as a little drawstring knapsack that he had with him. He had gotten the shotgun from his father (his parents were separated) when he was staying with him the previous weekend. When his mother picked him up, he had disassembled (he had gone on YouTube and learned how to disassemble)—the shotgun, placed it in his knapsack, and he carried it home with him when his mother picked him up on Sunday to start school that following Monday. He brought all those items to school on Monday. He went to his first three periods. He had, what we discovered later, the intention not necessarily of shooting any particular student. The only person he had a focus on, if he could get to that person, was his science teacher from his freshman year. But that teacher was on the third floor at the time that he decided to begin with the shooting.

He left the cafeteria, went to the bathroom, assembled the shotgun, loaded the shotgun, took a couple of drinks from a bottle of vodka he had brought to school with him as well, then, as he re-entered the cafeteria—he had put the shotgun down his shirt and down his pants so you couldn’t see it as he exited the bathroom, passed the teacher who was on duty in that particular hallway and entered the cafeteria. As he entered it, he withdrew the shotgun and leveled it on a student who was probably about 10 feet away from him at the time, sitting at the table. Similar to Dale and your situation, this student who he shot was a “functional academic learning support” student—a student with autism, a certificate-bound student who’s in our program until the age of 21. He was there with his class of about 10–15 students who just happened to be sitting in the back of the cafeteria when this occurred. The shooter proceeded to get off one shot, which struck the student in the back, in the upper left quadrant of his back.

Then, at that moment, there was a teacher who, as the student was leveling the shotgun, was probably about 20 feet to his right, started approaching, I should say running, toward him as the first shot went off. Before he could fire the second shot, he was tackled by this teacher. In that process, the second shot went off, just missing my assistant principal at the time. It split [between] two of my teachers—a math teacher and the assistant principal—which actually caused hearing loss. The shot was that close; it caused hearing loss to my assistant principal in her right ear. Luckily that blast went, because of the angle of the shotgun, into the ceiling just above a table full of students who were sitting at the cafeteria table. At this point, the shooter was subdued by now three or four faculty members.

I was already responding to the first shot; I was in the cafeteria. Students had scattered—we had about 500 kids in the lunchroom at that time. We have four lunch shifts of about 500 kids per lunch shift. Kids were running out of any one of four exits. As they did, I proceeded to give aid to the student who was shot. We immediately called a code red, which closed the building, locked the students down wherever they were and teachers, per policy, took in students out of the hallways and proceeded with the appropriate drill for that scenario in a lockdown.

Right about this time, a little before 11 a.m. at this point, we were fortunate that the Baltimore County SWAT officers were very close. They were nearby the school because it was one of their days of training. They were probably, as the crow flies, 2 or 3 miles from the school, preparing to engage in their training for the day. We had really good response from our SWAT team. I would say within 10 minutes, the first responders were there, the SWAT officers were there. We had response from about half a dozen different law enforcement agencies, from two or three federal agencies—FBI, ATF—as well as Baltimore city respondents and all of the Baltimore County sheriff’s department, police department, and so forth. We had a really solid, quick response from our first responders, as well as EMS.

At that point, once the building, once the shooter was secured and he was taken off to our local precinct to begin questioning, then began the long process as Dale and Warman explained in terms of securing the rest of the building. We weren’t sure if there was a second shooter, or if there was another instance that was going to occur, because the kids were locked down. The police began a really methodical search of every classroom with bomb-sniffing dogs and with other apparatus to go through every classroom. Once we were sure that there were no bombs, there wasn’t a second shooter, we proceeded to dismiss every classroom one by one. My role in that function was to make sure that as the students exited the main building—we had them exit out of one door—that I was there to really make sure that they saw me before they left and to reinforce and reassure the students and staff that everything was OK.

We had set up a reunification about a quarter-mile down the road. The police had set up a perimeter probably a good 500–600 yards away from the school, which helped keep the parents and the media away from the school (which, looking back in our after-action report, was really beneficial in terms of keeping things calm and not having parents report directly to the school). At that point, we had about 47 buses that came to our school every day, so we had our buses go to the middle school, which is about a quarter-mile down the road, and assemble there. That’s where parents were waiting.

Our CIRT team—critical incident response team—was activated, led by our superintendent, so that was turned on, where our superintendent, chief of police, and all of the team throughout the county (similar to Dale’s experience) was really managing the situation from a central officer perspective. I was in constant communication at that point with my assistant superintendent and with the superintendent throughout the day and certainly for the weeks following. Once it was deemed appropriate that the students could leave the building, they had to leave all their belongings in their classroom. They could not drive—for our students who drove, they could not drive—they had to leave everything where they were. They exited one classroom at a time. That took us about an hour and a half to exit the entire building and get the kids down to the middle school where parents were waiting, or they got on their bus and they were taken home. We had sent out, at this point, two to three communications to our parents. Our communications team had sent out press releases to the entire community and the greater Baltimore County community, just to let parents know how our students were going to be dismissed, let them know where they could pick them up, and when children could be expected home.

Later that afternoon, I’d say probably around 2:00 p.m. or 3:00 p.m., was my first opportunity to meet with my faculty, because the majority of my faculty was at the middle school, at the reunification site, where I dispatched two assistant principals. I had five assistant principals. I sent two of them to the middle school to handle the reunification. I kept the other three with me at the school to help with dismissal and to work with the police as they were sweeping the building, searching for any other items and to secure it.

When we met, it was decided that because there were no fatalities, among other reasons, we would actually open the next day. We felt it was important that students get back into their routine as quickly as possible. We didn’t want kids sitting at home after such a tragedy, in some cases by themselves because their parents were working. We wanted them back in school. We could provide the wraparound services. So, I updated my staff, explained to them the procedures for tomorrow. The system really was a phenomenal support in getting us our trauma teams. We have about five to six trauma teams in Baltimore County Schools, so I had two to three of those trauma teams assigned to my building. They consisted of counselors, a few personnel workers, social workers, and Baltimore County government services. We had, really, an army of support that came to the school the next day. But before we could reopen our doors, we had to collect all the belongings.

The police released the school back to me around 6:00 p.m. My assistant principals and I went about collecting all the materials—the kids’ book bags and purses, whatever they had left—and we had staged them in our auditorium, on the stage, by class. We knew that any of the children in the cafeteria would report to the auditorium, while the rest of the kids would report to the room where they left. When they reported the next day to the classroom where they left, or the auditorium, their belongings were categorized and labeled and ready for them. I had an opportunity to speak with the kids in the auditorium who were in the cafeteria [during the time of the shooting]. At that point, it really was about not letting the situation define our school, really bringing the kids together and letting them know that there was a whole slew of supports for them, explaining those supports, explaining those supports to our teachers, who I met with that morning again for about half an hour, to let them know what supports were available for them as adults, for their families, and for our students.

For about the next week, once we had school reopened, we had the trauma teams in place. We still were monitoring the student who was shot—he was in our Maryland Shock Trauma hospital for about four to six weeks, well into September and early October. At that point, it was about “How do we redefine our school? How do we redefine our new ‘normal’?” Because certainly our community and our school weren’t the normal that we understood the first day of school when we opened the day before.

Advice to Principals

Levin-Epstein: We’ve just had yet another incident, in Santa Fe, TX. What lessons did you learn that you can pass on to the principal at that school or other principals who might be in a similar situation?

Hall: It reinforces something that I think we all know intuitively: that safety is a base need for people. When you look at it in the context of having been through a crisis, it reinforces for me that we’re never going to get people to be able to perform higher functions like learning and teaching if we can’t meet the basic needs of feeling safe at school. If teachers and students don’t feel safe, we’re not going to have quality lessons being put together. Insecurity puts learning in jeopardy. We’re not going to have deep thinking by students, or even adequate school attendance, if the climate of the school is not safe.

I think the takeaway for me is that there is a balance between the work of building up facilities and improving training with the work we also need to do to help people feel safe in the way they interact at school. The human aspect of our work with one another cannot be ignored. It’s been impressed on me even since our crisis how important it is for students to have a clearly defined and reliable way to report concerns—be that bullying or a crime that they’ve witnessed. Our district is grappling with finding an effective way to maintain this balance.

The final point is that school safety is also a ripe ground for school leaders and district leaders to really engage in some community relations. It’s too big of a task, given budgets for a lot of us around the country, to really think that we’re going to effectively make schools safer if it is always done on a low-cost basis. I think it’s going to have to involve a lot of communities around the country, including our own here, having very real discussions about “How does community policing play into it?” “How do you work with your local law enforcement, maybe in a more intimate way?” “How does the voting community in your town or in your region consider bond elections that are coming up?” I thought that both George and Dale brought up some excellent points about facility redesign, new resources; and that all is often beyond what states provide to schools in normal budgeting. Local communities can and probably should be a part of looking at bonding to help with a lot of those costs and just reinforcing that it is good and it is appropriate to contact law enforcement with reports and concerns. My prayers and my love go out to the folks in Santa Fe, TX, and the other communities hit by school violence this year.

Roberts: Real quick, three points here. First, as I mentioned a little earlier when we did our panel interview on Capitol Hill and some other locations, there really is no manual. As I talk with principals—particularly, we had Dr. [Jake] Heibel, who’s principal at St. Mary’s County at Great Mills [High School] that had a shooting and fatalities a couple of months ago here in Maryland—what I shared with him and with other principals who’ve gone through this is that there is no manual for a school shooting. Certainly as principals we all train, and we have emergency training, and we have our various drills, but depending on when the shooting is, where the shooting occurs, how many other students are around—on numerous factors—the best-laid plans can go out the window. Even with rally points and all the things that we have to train for and have to have in place, there’s a level of flexibility that a principal has to be able to maintain and be willing to accept based on what happened.

Secondly, after the shooting, when we’re looking at the aftermath—whether the immediate aftermath or the months or years after the aftermath—it’s really allowing the students or the community to offer input on how to rebuild, how to rebuild the community, reconnect with each other. As principals, sometimes we take this mindset of “OK, we’re the leaders. We have to make the decisions. We’re the ones who have to be out in front of everything.” Well, sometimes it’s OK to lead from behind in situations like this. Really let the kids—particularly if you’re at a secondary level, but even at an elementary level—let the children and the parents offer ideas and suggestions on how to move the school and the community forward.

Lastly, something that’s overlooked, particularly in the immediate aftermath, but certainly in the mid- to long range is, how do you prepare your school community as a principal for the next shooting that’s going to occur somewhere in our country? It’s one of the things I shared with Dr. Heibel and St. Mary’s County, which was as you are dealing with the aftermath at your shooting, you’re going to have to know that there’s going to be another shooting. We had the incident in Texas a few days ago [in May 2018]. So, another one, unfortunately, will happen. When that happens, how are you going to prepare your school, your kids, your parents, your teachers for that flood of emotions that come back, for those thoughts and feelings that come back? It’s really making sure that when another tragedy like this occurs halfway around the world or next door somewhere in the country, how prepared are you to continue to support your kids?

Marsden: In terms of my advice for the principal, it’s important to restore conditions to allow folks to fully return to campus. I think it’s very difficult. Obviously, the greater the casualties, the greater the burden of attending funerals, attending to families and staff. It’s far-reaching. I think that when I reflect on the current state of North Park Elementary, a year out, we still have full-time counseling staff available on-site to the team. We still have a body of substitute staff available to relieve teachers, if necessary. We’re still conducting what we call an “after-action review” with the leadership to learn from the experience so that we can grow our professional development and learn how we best respond should a future event occur. But then, also looking at what are the best systems to put in place to increase or improve safety to our schools. We’re looking at everything from trauma-informed care to self-care, taking care of the adults who are involved, as well as infrastructure and safety improvements. [We’re] looking at strengthening single points of entry, ensuring solid video surveillance systems, ensuring proper visitor management systems and procedures for entry to the school, looking at things like standardized fencing around the perimeter of our elementary schools, or all of our schools.

So, those are some of the things that we’re continuing to focus on. How do we continue to strengthen and build relationships with our first responders and what I’ll call citizen responders—when you have folks in the community who come together and respond—how do you continue to strengthen those relationships and, again, repair and restore as much as possible, trying to return to new normal? So, those are some of the things that we’re working on now. My advice to the principal would be to go slow to go fast: Start with relationships, keep your main focus on healing for at least a year or more. Be patient on the other areas that might come with academics. I think that you continue the good work going forward for young people; oftentimes we can get out of balance between support and the consequences of such an event. Wanting to learn from the experiences we’ve had and how those experiences can help us become stronger and capitalize on that, that because of this event we are stronger people; our relationships are stronger, our commitment is stronger, and we will do better than we’ve done before. I think that’s the mindset that we have to enter into the future conversation with.

Preventing Active Shooters From Entering Your Campus

Levin-Epstein: If money were not as much of an issue, what could principals do to prevent active shooters from entering your campus?

Hall: That’s an interesting question. It’s tough to talk about what-ifs. If that were a possibility, I would just love to see all resources allocated to building that base-level safety and security for learning at our sites at schools the same way we invest in security in airports and banks right now. Folks’ money is important to them, and obviously they want to get where they’re going safely on an airplane. But when we send our kids to school, I think if money weren’t an object, we would look at it the same way.

I think it would be balanced this way in my mind: We’d design schools much like Dale talked about, with all the best input we can on how to make it a secure facility so that we are keeping an eye on access-control and safety in all those areas. I would also … have a balanced approach in safety between security personnel and counseling personnel, so that once our children get on campus, they feel like they’re in a haven. They may make it past the fort out there on the perimeter, but when they get in here it’s a haven of learning—we need to invest the time to make sure that students’ social, emotional, and even physical selves feel like they’re in a haven of learning when we’re here. Then, I think the third point is that we have to look at the safety of the community as a whole. If we let our towns and our cities go and end up becoming a society where there’s chaos where they’ve got to walk home, then we’re not doing our part to provide services, supports, even guidance and training, for families and communities on healthy learning and safety for kids. It’s not going to do much to have these little fortresses of schools, even if we accomplish that, if we’re letting chaos reign out there in society. I’m not saying that’s where we’re at right now, but I would love to see that we’re looking for ways people are even safe walking down our streets and going to and from school.

Roberts: The only thing I would add to that … [is] a school safety center in every state and every school district. We are fortunate in Maryland, as Dale mentioned. We’ve had a school safety office in existence for several years now, really modeled after Virginia’s program. I think Virginia might have been the first in the nation to have it, or was certainly one of the early adopters, of a statewide school safety center that focuses solely on how to make schools safer from all perspectives, physically and certainly the emotional supports for kids.

I think too, as mentioned earlier, kind of the wraparound services, hiring more people—personnel workers, more social workers, more school counselors—those folks who are trained to identify early on students who may be in need or may be in crisis and need further support. When we talk about physical security, I definitely think that adding secure vestibules—we don’t have to do that just for new construction. If we can retrofit buildings where once you enter you’re locked into a secure vestibule where you can only go into the main office; again, it’s not going to stop, necessarily, a school shooting, but it’s certainly one step further that could protect staff and students.

With that, lastly would be, if I could hire a person or persons who do nothing but really monitor the campus, meaning walk the campus. Sometimes we find with our school resource officers, if they get caught up in an investigation, or they’re supporting the principal of the school in another way, they’re not able to walk the campus. Or, if you have teachers on duty who get caught up in something [and they] aren’t able to, if there was solely a person or persons who could monitor and make sure all the doors are secured, make sure that the doors are locked, every door of the building, can really just walk the hallways and walk the perimeter as their sole job, I think that goes a long way to making the kids feel safer, the staff feel safer, and helping the school be more secure.

Marsden: I think the biggest or primary one would be controlling entry to ensure you have a single point of entry after the school bell rings. And even prior to the school bell ringing, when you might have multiple entries in high schools, ensuring that those entries are properly staffed and properly secured once the bell rings. The second area would be training of staff to understand how we respond, how do we communicate in, through, and after the crises. I think the third area would be to have a strong visitor-management system within the office setting so there’s several checkpoints. You might have a gate that they come in, then you might have an office with a secured buzzer door to come into the main office, and then before you can get out you’ve got to clear your identification with the front office staff. Then, limiting access with visitors to ensure the safest possible experience for our kids.